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Essay

What Are We Hoping For? Defining
Purpose in Deterrence-Based Correctional
Programs
†

Cecelia Klingele

INTRODUCTION
Probation has long offered individuals convicted of crime a
way to avoid the deleterious effects of incarceration and remain
in the community, bound by conditions designed to help them
develop the routines and skills essential to a law-abiding life.
The ultimate goal of probation is to promote desistance, the
process by which a person formerly engaged in criminal offend1
ing moves to a place of “long-term abstinence from crime.” This
process of “making good” is often difficult, requiring a probationer to abandon the habits and influences that have enabled
criminal behavior and to develop law-abiding norms and
2
prosocial relationships.
Although probation historically involved close mentoring
3
and monitoring by probation officers, growing caseloads and
resource constraints often result in lax supervision and uneven
4
enforcement of the conditions of supervision. As a result, in
† Assistant Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School. Many
thanks to Michael Tonry, Walter Dickey, Howard Erlanger, Ron Corbett, Kelly
Mitchell, and Kevin Reitz for conversations at various stages of this project.
Special thanks to the students of the Minnesota Law Review, especially Carla
Virlee, Danielle Meinhardt, and Andrea Miller, and to University of Wisconsin
law students Ashley Rouse, Catie White, Tip McGuire, and Matthew Hefti.
This Essay is derived from a keynote address given at the Minnesota Law Review’s 2014 Symposium, “Offenders in the Community: Reshaping Sentencing
and Supervision.” Copyright © 2015 by Cecelia Klingele.
1. SHADD MARUNA, MAKING GOOD: HOW EX-CONVICTS REFORM AND
REBUILD THEIR LIVES 26 (2001).
2. Id.
3. See, e.g., Anne Meis Knupfer, Professionalizing Probation Work in
Chicago, 1900–1935, 73 SOC. SERV. REV. 478 (1999).
4. See Joan Petersilia, Probation in the United States, 22 CRIME & JUST.
149, 150 (1997) (“As a result of inadequate funding, probation often means
freedom from supervision. Offenders in large urban areas are often assigned to
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many jurisdictions it is not uncommon for probationers to violate conditions of release with impunity for extended periods of
5
time before facing any consequence. When a consequence is
imposed, it is often revocation—the termination of probation
6
and the imposition of an often lengthy prison sentence.
When Judge Steven Alm launched the Hawaii Opportunity
Probation with Enforcement (HOPE) program, he was not trying to innovate. Quite the opposite: he was reacting against a
model of probation that struck him as being at odds with com7
mon sense and common experience. As he later explained to
Congress, from his first week on the bench as a state felony trial judge in Honolulu,
I could tell that the current probation system was broken. Probation
officers had caseloads of up to 180, and the dynamic was that offenders would repeatedly break the rules of supervision—by using drugs,
skipping probation appointments and failing treatment—because
there were no real consequences. After the offender racked up 20, 30
or more violations, the probation officer would feel they had a “good”
case for bringing a Motion for Revocation of Probation . . . and [would]
almost invariably recommend I sentence the offender to the underlying 5, 10 or 20 years in prison.
I saw this dynamic . . . and I thought to myself, “this is a crazy
way to operate. A crazy way to try to change anybody’s behavior.”
I thought to myself, “What did I do as a parent when my child
misbehaved?” I would repeat the rules and warn him that if it happened again, I would give him a specific consequence right away. And
he learned to connect the bad behavior with the consequence, and the
bad behavior stopped.
I thought if we could reorganize this creaky old probation system
to be swift, certain and proportionate for each and every violation, we
could more effectively supervise probationers.
8
And HOPE probation was born.

Judge Alm’s intuitions were supported by a substantial body of
research on the factors that deter people from engaging in prohibited behavior (whether that means committing new crimes
or violating conditions of supervision). Key to deterrence is a
100-plus caseloads, in which meetings occur at most once a month, and employment or treatment progress is seldom monitored.”).
5. Id.
6. For a more complete discussion of the dynamics of probation and revocation, see generally Cecelia Klingele, Rethinking the Use of Community Supervision, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1015 (2013).
7. Hawaii’s Opportunity Probation with Enforcement: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary [hereinafter Statement of Hon. Steven Alm], 111th Cong. (2010)
(statement of Hon. Steven Alm, Circuit Court Judge), available at http://
judiciary.house.gov/_files/hearings/pdf/Alm100511.pdf.
8. Id.
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belief on the part of the person being deterred (1) that prohibited behavior will be detected and (2) that an immediate, negative consequence is certain to accompany any detected viola9
tion.
Applying that logic to probation supervision meant increasing surveillance of people under supervision to detect more violations, and building the capacity of the probation agency and
the court to respond quickly to those violations. Judge Alm did
just that, creating a new intensive supervision program for
10
probationers identified as being at high risk of revocation. The
program made use of law enforcement officers who more closely
monitored and apprehended those probationers who missed
meetings or failed drug tests, and brought them quickly before
the court for custodial sanctions usually ranging from several
11
days to several weeks.
After a successful pilot program, Judge Alm persuaded his
colleagues on the bench to adopt HOPE in their courtrooms,
12
too. According to studies the Honolulu court later commissioned from outside researchers, the program worked spectacularly well: participants increased compliance with rules of supervision, and served less time in prison than people placed on
13
traditional probation caseloads.
The news traveled fast. Media outlets loved the idea of an
14
effective, tough-love approach to probation, and publicized
9. See generally Daniel S. Nagin, Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century,
42 CRIME & JUST. 199, 206 (2013) (discussing theories of deterrence and their
implications for public policy).
10. Statement of Hon. Steven Alm, supra note 7.
11. See Mark A. R. Kleiman & Kelsey R. Hollander, Reducing Crime by
Shrinking the Prison Headcount, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 89, 102–03 (2011);
Statement of Hon. Steven Alm, supra note 7.
12. See Steven S. Alm, HOPE for Your Probationers, 50 JUDGES’ J. 18, 20
(2011) (reporting that over a six-year period, all felony judges in the Honolulu
District Court began using HOPE with some probationers).
13. See ANGELA HAWKEN & MARK KLEIMAN, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE,
MANAGING DRUG INVOLVED PROBATIONERS WITH SWIFT AND CERTAIN
SANCTIONS: EVALUATING HAWAII’S HOPE (2012) [hereinafter HAWKEN &
KLEIMAN, MANAGING], available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/
229023.pdf; ANGELA HAWKEN & MARK KLEIMAN, RESEARCH BRIEF:
EVALUATION OF HOPE PROBATION (2008), available at http://www.colorado
.gov/ccjjdir/Resources/Committees/DrugTF/Handout/HOPE-ProbationEval_
ResearchBrief_HawkenANDKleiman08.pdf.
14. See Stephanie A. Duriez et al., Is Project HOPE Creating a False Sense
of Hope? A Case Study in Correctional Popularity, 78 FED. PROBATION 57, 61
(2014) (“The tough-love approach towards offenders is popular not just with
lawmakers but also with the American public. . . . [I]n a survey completed by
the Pew Research Center, [seventy-two] percent of the 1,284 adults who completed the telephone interview either mostly or completely agreed with the
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HOPE’s success in a number of major domestic newspapers and
15
magazines. By 2012, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ)
and the United States Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice Assistance had launched field experiments to replicate
16
HOPE in four jurisdictions around the country. Others followed, some funded through the NIJ and others arising out of
17
grassroots efforts in counties across the country. Although
HOPE replications and derivative programs vary in their specifics, all rely on the core insight that responding swiftly and
unfailingly to any violation of a condition of supervision is es18
sential in order to change behavior.
There is much about HOPE that deserves to be celebrated.
It shows the power of local officials to bring about change and
teaches that engagement in the lives of probationers can significantly affect their behavior. This Essay is neither an attack on
HOPE’s claims of success, nor is it an attempt to wholly undermine the role of deterrence-based correctional interventions
in enforcing the conditions of community supervision. It is instead an attempt to engage with the questions HOPE does not
ask, to show that, at times, the conditions that promote deterrence are in tension with the principles of desistance—and
sometimes with justice itself. When such a tension exists, it is
necessary to ask why we wish to deter and whether other values—such as proportionality, concern for human dignity, and
an appreciation of the dynamics of desistance—should trump
the very certainty and predictability that deterrence-based
models demand.
Following this Introduction, Part I reviews the basics of
probation supervision and compares standard probation to deterrence-based programs like HOPE. Part II examines the difference between the deterrence that programs like HOPE prostatement that, ‘The criminal justice system should try to rehabilitate criminals, not just punish them.’” (citation omitted)).
15. See, e.g., Bill Keller, America on Probation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2014,
at A19; Sam Kornell, Probation that Works, SLATE (June 5, 2013, 6:45 AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/science/2013/06/hawaii_
hope_probation_program_reduces_crime_drug_use_and_time_in_prison.html;
Jeffrey Rosen, Prisoners of Parole, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 8, 2010, at 36.
16. See Kevin McEvoy, HOPE: A Swift and Certain Process for Probationers, 269 NAT’L INST. JUST. J. 16, 17 (Mar. 2012). The initial sites selected were
Clackamas County, Oregon; Essex County, Massachusetts; Saline County, Arkansas; and Tarrant County, Texas. Id.
17. See Duriez et al., supra note 14, at 57 (citing Beth Pearsall, Replicating HOPE: Can Others Do as Well as Hawaii?, 273 NAT’L INST. JUST. J. 27, 29
(2014)).
18. See Statement of Hon. Steven Alm, supra note 7.
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mote and long-term desistance from crime, which is the ultimate goal of probation. This Part also explores the unintended
ways in which elements of deterrence-based correctional programs may find themselves in tension with the requirements of
procedural justice. Part III concludes with a call to use deterrence-based correctional programs with greater attention to the
ways in which they advance or interfere with legitimacy and
desistance. For all of their promise, these programs (and the
compliance they promote) should not become ends unto themselves. Instead, like any criminal justice intervention, deterrence-based correctional programs should be used as tools to
advance the larger goal of empowering probationers to desist
from crime—to trade criminality and addiction for more mature, prosocial modes of living. When the requirements of deterrence impede the larger and more fundamental goal of promoting desistance, helping probationers make lasting change
should trump training them to be compliant.
I. HOW HOPE WORKS
HOPE was a response to the failure of what it often called
19
“probation as usual.” To understand how HOPE works, it is
first necessary to understand the basic features of probation in
America today. Although there are widespread differences in
the structure and functioning of American probation agencies,
all share common features. This Part first reviews the fundamentals of probation, and then explains how HOPE operates
differently from typical probation, and to what effect.
A. PROBATION BASICS
Probation sentences are designed to offer courts a way of
holding people accountable for criminal behavior without removing them from the community. Traditionally, probation has
been seen as a way to rehabilitate minor, young, first-time, and
high-needs defendants, who—with the right kind of interven20
tion and redirection—might reform their lives. For that reason, early advocates of probation praised it as “one of the
21
highest forms of social work.”
Probation is the most common disposition imposed by

19. See generally Statement of Hon. Steven Alm, supra note 7 (describing
the origins of HOPE).
20. Klingele, supra note 6, at 1022–25.
21. Charles Evans Hughes, Jr., Probation Progress, 23 CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 915, 920 (1933).
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22

American courts in criminal cases. Although there are
variations in the way probation is configured in jurisdictions
throughout the country (in some jurisdictions probation is
treated as an alternative to a formal sentence; in others it is
23
treated as a sentence in its own right ), it always includes a
defined period of conditional release in the community,
24
sometimes preceded by a short jail stay. To successfully
complete a term of probation, a convicted person must comply
with a host of court-imposed conditions of supervision that
usually include regularly reporting to a probation officer;
avoiding new criminal conduct, including the consumption of
prohibited substances; attending work, classes, or treatment
programs; abstaining from alcohol; complying with a courtimposed curfew; avoiding other individuals under supervision
or with criminal records; paying restitution and monthly
supervision fees; and additional restrictions designed to
25
promote rehabilitation and contain risk. In some jurisdictions,
the probation department is authorized to add additional rules
26
to those imposed by the court.
22. In 2001, sixty percent of those under correctional supervision were
serving terms of probation. Wayne A. Logan, The Importance of Purpose in
Probation Decision Making, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 171, 191 (2003). Of the
6,937,600 adults under the control of U.S. correctional agencies (jails, prisons,
and community supervision departments) at the end of 2012, 3,942,800 were
on probation. LAUREN E. GLAZE & ERINN J. HERBERMAN, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2012, at 3
(2013), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus12.pdf.
23. Compare People v. Daniels, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 887, 891 (Ct. App. 2003)
(“Although courts sometimes refer to it as a ‘sentence,’ probation is not a sentence even if it includes a term in the county jail as a condition. In granting
probation, the court suspends imposition or execution of sentence and issues a
revocable and conditional release as an act of clemency.” (citation omitted)),
with State v. Hamlin, 950 P.2d 336, 339 (Or. Ct. App. 1997) (“With the passage of the sentencing guidelines, . . . [p]robation is no longer the suspension of
a sentence; probation is the sentence.”).
24. Using jail in combination with probation is a practice often referred
to as a split sentence. A 1997 study found that split sentences were used in
approximately a quarter of felony cases. Joan Petersilia, Probation in the
United States, PERSPECTIVES, Spring 1998, at 30, 35.
25. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3563 (2012); OR. REV. STAT. § 137.540(1) (2013);
N.H. SUPER. CT. R. 107 (2014); see also KELLY LYN MITCHELL ET AL., ROBINA
INST. CRIM. LAW & CRIM. JUSTICE, PROFILES IN PROBATION REVOCATION
(2014), available at http://www.robinainstitute.org/up-content/uploads/Robina
-Report-2015-WEB.pdf (summarizing probation conditions in twenty-one different states).
26. See, e.g., ARIZ. CODE OF JUD. ADMIN. § 6-207 (2010) (when supervising
probationers through interstate compact, “[p]robation departments may add
additional conditions”); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-533(3) (2014) (“As authorized
by court order, probation officers may establish additional reasonable conditions of probation with which the juvenile offender must comply.”); WIS.
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The laws governing release conditions are broadly
permissive; there are very few constitutional restrictions on the
kind of conditions that may be imposed on probationers,
primarily because courts treat most probation conditions as
inherently less punitive than the period of confinement the
27
court is otherwise authorized to impose. In many jurisdictions,
probationary sentences include a stock set of basic conditions to
28
which all offenders are subject. Those basic conditions are
often enhanced for specific categories of offenders, including
those convicted of sex crimes, crimes of domestic violence, and
29
operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. In addition,
courts are authorized to impose additional conditions of
30
supervision at their discretion. These “special conditions” have
included a wide range of requirements, from ordering
defendants to write apology letters to holding signs in public
proclaiming their crimes, to attaching bumper stickers to their
31
cars.
ADMIN. CODE § DOC 328.04(3)(s) (2013) (“Comply with any additional rules
that may be established by an agent. The rules may be modified at any time as
appropriate.”).
27. See Jasmine S. Wynton, Note, MySpace, YourSpace, But Not
TheirSpace: The Constitutionality of Banning Sex Offenders from Social Networking Sites, 60 DUKE L.J. 1859, 1886 (2011) (“Offenders on probation, parole, or supervised release have diminished constitutional rights and thus receive less constitutional protection than those who are no longer under state
supervision.”); see also Judicial Review of Probation Conditions, 67 COLUM. L.
REV. 181, 202–07 (1967).
28. Heather Barklage et al., Probation Conditions vs. Probation Officer
Directives: Where the Twain Shall Meet, 70 FED. PROBATION 37, 37 (2006)
(“Currently, both federal and state probation and parole systems utilize what
are known as ‘standard conditions of supervision.’ These ‘standard’ conditions
routinely require the offender to: 1) avoid commission of any new offenses; 2)
notify the supervising agency prior to leaving the district of supervision; 3) notify the supervising agency of any change in residence; 4) maintain stable employment; 5) report any new arrests without delay to the supervising agency;
6) report regularly to the supervising agency; and 7) to comply with any directives or instructions from the supervising corrections agent.”).
29. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3563(a)(4) (2012) (imposing special conditions on
domestic violence offenders); Id. § 3563(a)(8) (imposing special conditions for
sex offenders).
30. See, e.g., id. § 3563(b) (listing twenty-two discretionary conditions,
and authorizing “such other conditions as the court may impose”). A study of
individuals on conditional release in Wisconsin revealed an average of thirty
conditions per offender, approximately half of which were discretionary. KIT
VAN STELLE & JANAE GOODRICH, THE 2008/2009 STUDY OF PROBATION AND
PAROLE REVOCATION 158 (2009), available at https://uwphi.pophealth.wisc
.edu/about/staff/van-stelle-kit/2008-2009-study-of-probation-and-parole
-revocation.pdf.
31. See, e.g., Ross E. Milloy, Texas Judge Orders Notices Warning of Sex
Offenders: Car and Home Signs Elicit Praise and Shock, N.Y. TIMES, May 29,
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Many commonly imposed conditions of probation target
behaviors that are closely tied to probationers’ risk of criminal
re-offending. These include prohibitions on weapon possession
for violent offenders and on drug or alcohol use for those with
32
substance abuse related convictions. Many other conditions,
however, govern aspects of life that are not directly relevant to
criminal behavior. Curfews, blanket prohibitions on alcohol
use, and requirements that probationers complete school may
sound like a good idea to the judges imposing conditions and to
the probation officers administering a probation sentence—the
rationale being that life circumstances, such as unemployment,
poverty, and lack of education increase the risk of harm to the
community—but they are restrictions on liberty that do not
closely correspond to the particular risk of criminal harm posed
by most people under supervision.
The cumulative effect of these conditions is undeniably
punitive. The requirements of probation can be daunting,
particularly for those with limited means. Probationers must
come up with extra money for monthly supervision fees and
program co-pays while still paying child support, restitution,
and ordinary bills; find stable housing; retain a job or attend
school while never missing court-ordered treatment programs
and meetings; find timely and reliable transportation to and
from court appointments, office visits, and counseling sessions;
avoid socializing with others under supervision or convicted of
felony offenses (a group that may include family members,
former associates, and neighbors); kick drug or alcohol
addictions; ask permission before traveling; avoid alcohol
(including at weddings and other special gatherings); report
home by curfew—and all the while remain polite to the
probation and court officials who have the power to revoke
33
probation. With so many obligations present in any given
2001, at A10 (discussing the requirement that sex offenders post signs on
homes and vehicles); Dan Slater, The Judge Says: Don’t Get Pregnant. A
Lapsed Law Now Sees New Life, WALL ST. J., Sept. 25, 2008, at A18, available
at http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122230566090673847 (last visited Apr. 2,
2015) (discussing the requirement that defendant avoid getting pregnant);
Cary Spivak & Dan Bice, Front-Seat Ban Adds to Odd Legacy of Judge
Schellinger, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Apr. 18, 2003, at 1B (discussing the ban
prohibiting probationers from sitting in the front seat of a car).
32. One 1995 study of probationers found that “[m]ore than two out of
five probationers were required to enroll in substance abuse treatment . . . .
Nearly a third of all probationers were subject to mandatory drug testing . . . .”
THOMAS P. BONZCAR, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CHARACTERISTICS OF ADULTS ON
PROBATION, 1995, at 7 (1997).
33. See Klingele, supra note 6, at 1034–35.
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case, it is not surprising that violations are common. As one
experienced probation officer observed, “[I]f you can’t write up a
report, and cite at least a technical violation, you’re not really
struggling very hard, because there are so many conditions.
There’s got to be something that the guy didn’t do right,
34
right?”
Although conditions often seem reasonable when
considered individually, in the aggregate the sheer number of
requirements makes compliance with all of them nearly
impossible for many probationers, especially those whose
ability to follow directions is already compromised by learning
35
difficulties, mental health challenges, and poor education. It is
for this reason that studies have repeatedly shown that many
individuals experienced with the criminal justice system would
prefer a short term of incarceration to a longer period of
36
probation.
While probation is intended to be an alternative to
incarceration, it is a disposition that frequently ends in imprisonment. Recent estimates suggest that more than one-third of
probationers in the United States either stop reporting to their
probation agents (abscond) or are terminated (revoked) from
probation and sent to prison for violating their probation condi37
tions. Approximately half of the people in U.S. jails, and more
than one-third of those entering prison, have been incarcerated
38
as a result of revocation from either probation or parole.
Although probation revocation rates vary tremendously from
one jurisdiction to another and are not perfectly recorded, it is
clear that in many jurisdictions the failure of community
supervision accounts for a dramatic portion of new prison

34. Id. at 1035.
35. See infra, Part II.B.
36. See DAVID C. MAY & PETER B. WOOD, RANKING CORRECTIONAL
PUNISHMENTS: VIEWS FROM OFFENDERS, PRACTITIONERS, AND THE PUBLIC 43–
46 (2010).
37. Angela Hawken, The Message from Hawaii: HOPE for Probation,
PERSPECTIVES, Summer 2010, at 36, 37.
38. PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, WHEN OFFENDERS BREAK THE RULES:
SMART RESPONSES TO PAROLE AND PROBATION VIOLATIONS 3 (2007) (“[S]hifts
in practices with respect to parole release and reincarceration for parole violations accounted for 60 percent of the increase in the nation’s prison population
between 1992 and 2001.”). Parole is a form of post-carceral community supervision similar to probation in its requirements. See also Alfred Blumstein &
Allen J. Beck, Reentry As a Transient State Between Liberty and Recommitment, in PRISONER REENTRY AND CRIME IN AMERICA 50, 56 (Jeremy Travis &
Christy Visher eds., 2005).
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39

admissions.
Why is the probation failure rate so high? Many factors,
40
both cultural and legal, drive revocation rates. Cultural
influences include risk aversion—in a time when crime makes
the headlines, many probation agencies have little tolerance for
41
any infraction. Others lack meaningful alternative sanctions
to revocation, such as day community-based programs and
42
short-term detention options. Some agencies (and the courts
and district attorney’s offices with whom they partner) simply
hold fast to the conviction that probation is a “second chance”
and that probationers don’t deserve a third if they are
unwilling or unable to comply with the conditions of their
43
release.
The legal authority to revoke probation arises whenever a
probationer violates a condition of supervision. Such violations
are rampant, in large part because the number and breadth of
conditions imposed make slip-ups nearly unavoidable. Yet
despite the frequency with which probationers violate the
conditions of their release—or perhaps because of it—not every
39. E. ANN CARSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2013, at 10
(2014), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p13.pdf.
40. See generally Klingele, supra note 6, at 1045–47.
41. Although there are many examples of cases in which people under
community supervision have committed crimes that drew public attention, the
most cited case is that of Willie Horton, a prisoner on furlough who brutally
murdered a Massachusetts couple. See Robert S. Blanco, Mixing Politics and
Crime, 59 FED. PROBATION 91, 92 (1995). Public outrage about his crime has
been repeatedly blamed for costing Michael Dukakis the presidency in 1988.
Id.
42. For a description of meaningful intermediate sanctions, see generally
NORVAL MORRIS & MICHAEL TONRY, BETWEEN PRISON AND PROBATION:
INTERMEDIATE PUNISHMENTS IN A RATIONAL SENTENCING SYSTEM (1990) (advocating for increased use of intermediate punishments instead of the extremes of prison and probation).
43. The rhetoric of “second chances” abounds in case transcripts. See, e.g.,
Brief of Respondent at 29, Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2007) (No. 08-7412)
(“[Defendant] was given a second chance by having adjudication withheld,
serving one year in county jail, and being placed on probation.”); Answer Brief
of Appellee at 4, Smith v. Florida, 143 So.3d 1023 (2014) (Nos. 4D12-3812,
4D12-3813, 4D12-3814, and 4D12-4174), (“He has had a second chance when
he should have been sentenced, in theory, to prison initially.”); Government’s
Response to Defendant’s Objections to Presentence Report, United States v.
Vargas-Aguirre, 2007 WL 2973622 (D. Ariz.) (No. CR 06-430-TUC-DCB)
(“[Y]ou were on probation . . . when you did this . . . . You asked for a second
chance . . . . You don’t get a second chance from me, or a third chance from
me.”). It has also been echoed in numerous interviews of probation and prosecution officials conducted by the author as part of the University of Minnesota
Robina Institute’s Probation Revocation Project. For more information on that
project, see http://www.robinainstitute.org/probation-revocation-project.
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44

violation leads to formal sanction.
Since probation officers are not omnipresent, many
45
violations go undetected. Others, while detected, seem minor
46
enough that officers may overlook them. Often, the paperwork
required to file for revocation is sufficiently time-consuming
that officers are loathe to bring a probationer before the court
unless he or she has committed a significant offense or accrued
47
a laundry list of technical violations.
Such was the case in Honolulu when Judge Alm began
presiding over criminal cases. Probation officers, overloaded
with large caseloads and with few sanctioning options short of
revocation, would allow violations to accrue for months or more
before finally filing petitions to revoke and to send the violators
48
to prison, often for lengthy periods of time. HOPE arose out of
Judge Alm’s efforts to increase compliance with conditions of
supervision while simultaneously reducing the number of
probation cases ending in revocation.
B. WHAT HOPE DOES DIFFERENTLY
The idea that predictable punishment decreases crime is
inherent in the ordering of most civilized systems of governance. It was first articulated in modern terms by Cesare
Beccaria, who denounced the overly punitive criminal justice
practices of his day, in which minor crimes often resulted in
capital sentences, and advocated instead for less severe pun49
ishments imposed with certainty and immediacy. Those same
principles have been affirmed by modern students of deter50
rence. Studies have repeatedly shown that people tend not to
be deterred by harsh punishments, but can be deterred by the
reasonable expectation of detection, even when accompanied by
51
the anticipation of only modest punishment.
44. See, e.g., Hawken, supra note 37, at 40.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. (“Because violation rates were high . . . no probation officer had the
time to write up every violation, and no judge would have had the time to hear
all those cases had they been filed.”).
48. See Alm, supra note 12, at 18.
49. See generally CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (5th
ed. 2009) (1764) (advocating for reform of mid-eighth century criminal justice).
50. See generally Paul Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence
in the Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best,
91 GEO. L.J. 949 (2003) (questioning the effectiveness of current deterrence
strategies).
51. See, e.g., Harold G. Grasmick & George J. Bryjak, The Deterrent Effect
of Perceived Severity of Punishment, 59 SOC. FORCES 471 (1980) (finding that
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Intuitively conscious of those principles, Judge Alm reorganized the way probation was operating for those at highest
52
risk of revocation. For those individuals—and only for those
individuals—he devised a system that would provide a rapid
response to all detected violations (which were predominately
missed appointments and failed drug tests) and ensure a
53
speedy hearing and immediate sanction short of revocation. It
was his hope that by getting the word out that rule violations
were taken seriously in his courtroom, probationers would start
54
taking rules seriously and would begin to comply with them.
Doing so would not only prevent lengthy prison sentences upon
revocation, he conjectured, but would also improve the legiti55
macy of the larger system.
Eager to put the program to testing by outside experts,
Alm sought evaluation. In 2007, Angela Hawken from Pepperdine University and Mark Kleiman from UCLA obtained
grants from the National Institute of Justice and the SmithRichardson Foundation to perform a randomized controlled
56
study of the effects of HOPE. Their study yielded dramatic results: they found that probationers who participated in HOPE
served the same amount of jail time (in the form of prerevocation sanctions) as their “probation-as-usual” counterparts but were only sentenced to approximately one-third the
perceived severity of punishment deterred only when combined with high levels of perceived certainty in punishment); AM. CORR. ASS’N, RECLAIMING
OFFENDER ACCOUNTABILITY: INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS FOR PROBATION AND
PAROLE VIOLATORS (Edward E. Rhine ed., 1993) (concluding that intermediate
sanctions can help ease overcrowding problems in U.S. prisons).
52. The best deterrence-based correctional programs avoid using high intensity supervision for all probationers, but only for those whose behavior
places them at highest risk of revocation and re-offense. Studies have shown
that providing intensive services and supervision to low risk individuals tends
to increase their overall risk by exposing them to higher risk offenders (in programs and at probation offices) and by detecting minor violations unlikely to
escalate and that do not otherwise warrant a formal response. See, e.g.,
ALISON LAWRENCE & DONNA LYONS, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES, PRINCIPLES OF EFFECTIVE STATE SENTENCING AND
CORRECTIONS 11 (2011), available at http://www.ncsl.org/documents/cj/pew/
WGprinciplesreport.pdf (advocating for tailored supervision of parolees);
Christopher T. Lowenkamp & Edward J. Latessa, Understanding the Risk
Principle: How and Why Correctional Interventions Can Harm Low-Risk Offenders, 2004 TOPICS IN CMTY. CORRECTIONS 3, available at http://www
.uc.edu/content/dam/uc/ccjr/docs/articles/ticc04_final_complete.pdf (discussing
risk principle and its implications in the corrections context).
53. See Statement of Hon. Steven Alm, supra note 7.
54. Id.
55. Alm, supra note 12, at 18.
56. Id. at 20.
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57

amount of prison time as the control group. In other words,
more immediate jail sanctions during the period of probation
led to fewer probation failures overall.
Soon policy institutes, government agencies, and local jurisdictions were clamoring for more HOPE, both in Hawaii and
on the mainland. The Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University named HOPE one of the top twenty-five inno58
vations in government in 2013, and the Institute for Behavior
and Health dramatically asserted that “HOPE holds the promise of significantly reducing the demand for illegal drugs, crime,
59
and prison populations across the U.S.” In addition to acclaim,
the project has drawn committed interest from jurisdictions
across the country who have tried to replicate it, in full or in
part. According to Professor Hawken, there are “at least 40 jurisdictions in 18 states that have implemented similar mod60
els.”
Some scholars have expressed skepticism about the dramatic reductions in violations HOPE claims to effect. These
critics have challenged the reliability of the research design
used to obtain the favorable evaluation results and questioned
the degree to which Hawaii’s experiment with HOPE is exportable to other jurisdictions with different probation populations
61
and local dynamics. Even if critics are right, however, and the
results of programs like HOPE are less dramatic than current
reports suggest, it appears that HOPE does at least reduce the
violations of supervision for which it monitors probationers,
and thereby reduces to some degree the risk of revocation for
those under supervision.
But how? One of the most important aspects of deterrence
to which HOPE has been attentive is the need to target for in62
tervention individuals who are at risk of being revoked. From
the beginning of the program, the probationers selected for the
57. See HAWKEN & KLEIMAN, MANAGING, supra note 13, at 4.
58. See Kornell, supra note 15.
59. ROBERT L. DUPONT, HOPE PROBATION: A MODEL THAT CAN BE
IMPLEMENTED AT EVERY LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT 1 (2008), available at
http://ibhinc.org/pdfs/HOPEPROBATION2.pdf.
60. Duriez et al., supra note 14, at 57.
61. See generally id. (arguing that Project HOPE may not be as effective
in other jurisdictions as it is in Hawaii); see also Steven N. Durlauf & Daniel
S. Nagin, Imprisonment and Crime: Can Both Be Reduced? in 10
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 13, 39 (2011) (questioning whether there is sufficient evidence to suggest that “Project Hope can be extrapolated to the rest of
the United States”).
62. Alm, supra note 12, at 18–19.
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program were those in danger of being revoked to prison be63
cause of repeated violations of the conditions of their release.
This seemingly small detail matters: insofar as a goal of HOPE
and related programs is to prevent the harsh sanction of probation revocation, the individuals targeted for close monitoring
should be those who, without such intervention, would be likely
to end up incarcerated rather than those whose behavior would
not otherwise warrant formal sanction and whose probation is
likely to terminate successfully. The reason for this is simple:
as discussed above, minor violations of supervision conditions
are nearly unavoidable. If watched closely enough, any probationer could come to the attention of officials for failing to return home before curfew, filing a late reporting statement, or
being caught having a beer at a ballgame. If one of the goals of
programs like HOPE is to prevent revocation and imprisonment, then it is essential not to widen the net of governmental
social control or impose intensive supervision on individuals
who would not otherwise be prison-bound.
Once the right people have been targeted, it is necessary to
create a system for reliably detecting violations. While that
may sound challenging given the limited number of probation
officers and the relative freedom probationers have to go about
the community unobserved, many common violations are easily
detected. Probation officers routinely track new arrests, missed
visits with probation officers, missed and failed drug tests, failure to file financial reporting statements, and failure to pay
64
restitution and supervision fees. For HOPE to meet its goal of
deterring violations of these conditions, officers must keep close
tabs on probationers’ compliance and act quickly when non65
compliance is discovered. Other violations are more difficult to
63. Notably, this requirement arose at first from mere expedience: Judge
Alm and his probation staff recognized that they did not have the capacity to
respond in a timely way to violations by all probationers. See Hawken, supra
note 37, at 41. Consequently, for the purpose of minimizing paperwork, HOPE
began only with those probationers who were likely to face revocation if their
behavior did not change. Id.
64. Importantly, these easily detected violations may not be those most
important to advancing public safety or promoting desistance. Familial violence, fraud, unauthorized contact with vulnerable individuals, and changes in
employment status can be more difficult violations to detect and often have far
greater bearing on how well a probationer is moving toward desistance than
whether he paid a monthly fee or had a beer—particularly if he is poor and is
not an alcoholic.
65. That often means streamlining case management systems and encouraging probation officers to be as on top of their own paperwork as the officers require probationers to be. See MARK A.R. KLEIMAN, WHEN BRUTE
FORCE FAILS: HOW TO HAVE LESS CRIME AND LESS PUNISHMENT 34–37 (2009)
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detect but often become apparent when agents engage in more
intense supervision and have frequent contact with probationers, particularly in their homes or in other locations in the
community. Mothers, girlfriends, and other personal contacts
often reveal information to officers about violations of probation
upon which the agents can—and, if deterrence is the goal,
66
should—act.
Punishment deters best when it swiftly follows an infrac67
tion. Consequently, when violations come to the attention of
probation officers, programs like HOPE require officers to respond with a near-immediate sanction. To make this possible,
courts must create opportunities for regular status hearings on
violations so that probationers who are apprehended can receive quick punishment. Ordinarily, hearings are held within
68
seventy-two hours after a violation has been detected. At that
time, a sanction is imposed, which usually consists of several
days’ incarceration, though the length of custody may increase
69
with repeated violations.
Consistent, unwavering punishment is an essential feature
of any program based on a deterrence model. The reason for
this is twofold. First, consistency in punishment lends legitima70
cy to the system. Consistent punishment sends the message to
both probationers and members of the public that all probationers are held to the same standard and will be treated equal71
ly when they fail to meet expectations. Judge Alm has ex(describing Hawaii probation officers’ concerns about the time demands swift
reporting placed on them).
66. There is a danger in this kind of surveillance. While it may bring to
light violations that probation officers need to sanction if they wish to obtain
maximum deterrence, it can simultaneously fracture important relationships
in probationers’ lives, turning formerly trusted confidants and allies into state
informants. Cf. ALICE GOFFMAN, ON THE RUN: FUGITIVE LIFE IN AN AMERICAN
CITY (2014) (describing the roles played by women in informing on men under
supervision and the detrimental effects of those roles on men’s connections to
their families).
67. See Raymond Paternoster, How Much Do We Really Know About
Criminal Deterrence?, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 765 (2010) (discussing
deterrence of crime through sanctions).
68. See HAWKEN & KLEIMAN, MANAGING, supra note 13, at 13. During the
time between detection and the violation hearing, probationers are usually
held in custody. Some modification on this practice may be made when the
probationer contests the violation. In those cases, probationers are provided
with counsel and given a later court date. In many jurisdictions employing the
HOPE model, probationers who contest their violation and are found guilty
are given harsher sanctions than those who confess guilt at the outset.
69. Hawken, supra note 37, at 37.
70. See id. at 38.
71. Id.
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plained, “When the system isn’t consistent and predictable,
when people are punished randomly, they think, My probation
officer doesn’t like me, or, Someone’s prejudiced against me . . .
rather than seeing that everyone who breaks a rule is treated
72
equally, in precisely the same way.”
The second reason why punishment is mandated in every
case is that deterrence occurs only when probationers have reason to believe that pain will follow any breach of the rules.
Simply put, HOPE seeks to condition probationers to avoid rule
73
violations and to engage in required activities. The more predictable the punishment, the more likely the probationer will
74
be conditioned to avoid it.
Because the behavioral training on which the HOPE model
relies requires absolute predictability, there can be no deviation
from the pre-ordained punishment; to do so would necessarily
75
compromise the model’s deterrent effect. That means that individual characteristics of probationers, or the life circumstances that led to violating any particular rule of supervision on any
given occasion, cannot be considered by the court when sanc76
tioning. An appointment that is forgotten or missed due to a
late bus must be punished the same as an appointment that is
willfully ignored. Drug use that follows the death of a loved one
is not distinguished from drug use that follows a night of partying with friends. The goal of deterrence-based correctional programs is to prevent future violations, and punishment teaches
probationers to order their lives in ways that avoid violations,
whether that means keeping a better calendar, catching an ear77
lier bus, or finding new ways to cope with grief. Conditioning
only works if there is pain that outweighs the pleasure of the
activity being deterred.
This insensitivity to personal characteristics or circumstances has benefits beyond its deterrent effect: it is quick and
relatively cheap. HOPE violation hearings average seven
78
minutes. Expensive drug treatment is not ordered for all participants. Though treatment may be requested by anyone who
desires it, treatment is mandated only for individuals who re-

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Rosen, supra note 15, at 38.
See Hawken, supra note 37, at 40.
See B. F. SKINNER, SCIENCE AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 67–70, 173 (1953).
See Hawken, supra note 37, at 40–41.
See HAWKEN & KLEIMAN, MANAGING, supra note 13, at 9.
See id. at 57.
See id. at 30.
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79

peatedly fail drug tests.
Although deterrence theory mandates punishment for all
violations, it does not prescribe what punishment is needed to
ensure that a probationer will be optimally deterred. Programs
that have utilized the “swift and certain” sanctioning model
adopted by HOPE vary considerably in the kinds of sanctions
they impose for minor, routine violations. When HOPE began,
sanctions for a missed appointment or failed drug test ranged
80
from several days (served on the weekend) to several weeks.
Other programs following the HOPE model have imposed sanctions ranging from a day to a month in jail, depending on the
81
severity and frequency of violations. These periods of detention are sometimes referred to as “micro-sanctions” or “micro82
punishment” —terms that distinguish the shorter periods of
detention imposed for rule violations from the much lengthier
periods of imprisonment that would otherwise be imposed upon
revocation.
So: detection, quick response, and modest but unwavering
79. Id. at 27; see KLEIMAN, supra note 65, at 4.
80. Hawken, supra note 37, at 38, 42; Kleiman & Hollander, supra note
11, at 102.
81. See, e.g., MICH. STATE COURT ADMIN. OFFICE, DEVELOPING AND
IMPLEMENTING A SWIFT AND SURE SANCTIONS PROBATION PROGRAM IN
MICHIGAN app. A (2014), available at http://courts.mi.gov/Administration/
SCAO/Resources/Documents/Publications/Manuals/Specialty/SSSPPManual
.pdf (reporting sanctions of 3–30 days); MEREDITH FARRAR-OWENS, VA.
CRIMINAL SENTENCING COMM’N, IMMEDIATE SANCTION PROBATION PILOT
PROGRAM (2012), available at http://hac.virginia.gov/committee/files/2013/09
-16-13/Immediate_Sanction_Probation_Pilot_Project.pdf (listing sanctions of
3–10 days); Paul Suarez, Probation Violations Will Result in ‘Swift and Certain’ Penalties, COLUMBIAN (May 22, 2012), http://www.columbian.com/news/
2012/may/22/swift-and-certain-penalties-officials-hope-short-i (“In the past,
corrections officers had few options when dealing with violations. Now state
law says minor violations—including failing drug tests, not reporting to officers or not going to treatment—will send offenders to jail for one to three
days.”).
82. See, e.g., Keller, supra note 15 (“A few jurisdictions have tried to make
parole and probation less of a revolving door back to prison, with some encouraging results. . . . They employ a disciplinary approach called ‘swift and certain,’ which responds promptly with a punishment for missing an interview or
failing a drug test. The punishments start small, then escalate until the offender gets the message and changes his behavior—preferably before he has to
be sent back to prison.”); Josh Marquis, Op-Ed., Bergin Best Bet for Sheriff,
DAILY ASTORIAN (Mar. 6, 2012), http://www.dailyastorian.com/20120306/guest
-column-bergin-best-bet-for-sheriff (“Right now it is not uncommon for someone to test dirty several times before there is any consequence. And I’m not
talking about sending someone who keeps using meth to prison for three
years. That doesn’t happen. I’m talking about a ‘micro-sanction’ of maybe five
to 10 days.”).
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punishment are the three features of HOPE most responsible
for its deterrent effects.
II. WHAT IS THE COST OF DETERRENCE?
Probation does many things, but most fundamentally it offers people convicted of crimes the opportunity to be held accountable for their past criminal conduct while taking steps to
create and sustain a law-abiding future. With that goal in
mind, it is helpful to review what we know about how human
behavioral change occurs and to compare that to the dynamics
of deterrence-based correctional programs like HOPE.
A. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN DETERRENCE AND DESISTANCE
Deterrence is a strategy that seeks to prevent misconduct
83
through punishment for prohibited behavior. Desistance is the
process by which people move from active criminal offending to
84
a life that does not involve crime. Deterrence is focused on the
here-and-now: if I make the near-immediate consequences unpleasant enough, I can stop you from engaging in criminal behavior. Successful deterrence is measured by whether you
85
commit any crime. Desistance takes a longer view. Efforts
that promote desistance anticipate that moving from a life in
which crime is common to one in which it is nonexistent takes
time and requires the development of a new prosocial identity
86
with attendant prosocial relationships. Successful desistance
is demonstrated by improvement in the frequency and severity
87
of criminal offending.
Insofar as the end of the desistance process is the absence
of criminal offending, deterrence and desistance can overlap.
Strategies that promote deterrence are intended by the state to
promote or hasten desistence on the part of individuals who
83. Robinson & Darley, supra note 50, at 950 (“Lawmakers have sought to
optimize the control of crime by devising a penalty-setting system that assigns
criminal punishments of a magnitude sufficient to deter a thinking individual
from committing a crime.”).
84. MARUNA, supra note 1, at 17 (“Desistance from crime is an unusual
dependent variable for criminologists because it is not an event that happens,
rather it is the sustained absence of a certain type of event (in this case,
crime).”); John H. Laub & Robert J. Sampson, Understanding Desistance from
Crime, 28 CRIME & JUST. 1, 1, 8 (2001).
85. See Robinson & Darley, supra note 50, at 953–56.
86. See MARUNA, supra note 1, at 34.
87. See Laub & Sampson, supra note 84, at 8–9. See generally MARUNA,
supra note 1, at 19–35 (discussing different definitions and explanations for
desistence).
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engage in criminal behavior—preferably sooner rather than
later. Deterrence-based correctional programs, like HOPE, seek
to skip the “process” part of desistance, and by design they try
to move an offender from offending to law-abiding with no in88
termediate transition. Such a plan may work well for individuals whose involvement in the criminal justice system is minor
or fleeting and for whom crime is an abberration. However, for
those with lengthy criminal records, and for those whose criminal offending behavior is tied to addiction, mental illness, or
past trauma, “quitting crime” tends not to be the result of a
89
single encounter with punishment.
How does desistance work, then? Research into the causes
of desistance suggests that much like breaking any bad habit,
giving up a life of crime is a process that happens in fits and
90
starts. Repeat offenders do not usually turn into Boy Scouts
overnight; instead, people who “go straight” gradually increase
intervals between offending behaviors, which also tend to de91
crease in severity over time. A key factor in this change includes the development of strong bonds of informal social control, primarily through acquisition of stable employment or
92
marriage. In many cases, change also requires an individual
to develop a new self-narrative that allows him to make sense
of his past while taking ownership of his present and future. In
the context of drug addiction, for example,
[b]reaking away from the drug and the addict world—both symbolically and literally—is a crucial part of the desistance process. At the
same time, addicts need to forge new relationships, new interests, and
new investments in order to maintain cessation from drugs. The re93
sult of this process is an identity transformation.

Research on desistance echoes many of the principles that
the psychological community has identified as essential to recovery for those suffering from both addiction and mental illness. In 2005, the United States Substance Abuse and Mental
Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) convened a “National Summit on Recovery” to gather experts in the field of ad88. See generally MARUNA, supra note 1, at 19–37 (discussing the desistence process).
89. Id. at 17.
90. Id. at 26–27.
91. Id. at 19–35.
92. See generally ROBERT J. SAMPSON & JOHN H. LAUB, CRIME IN THE
MAKING: PATHWAYS AND TURNING POINTS THROUGH LIFE (1993) (providing a
general perspective that advocates examination of intra-individual change
across the life-course).
93. Laub & Sampson, supra note 84, at 34–35 (citing PATRICK BIERNACKI,
PATHWAYS FROM HEROIN ADDICTION RECOVERY WITHOUT TREATMENT (1986)).
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diction and mental illness to identify “guiding principles of re94
covery.” Among the twelve principles identified were many
relevant to desistance, including the following:
Recovery is self-directed and empowering.
Recovery involves a personal recognition of the need for
change and transformation.
Recovery is holistic.
Recovery has cultural dimensions.
Recovery exists on a continuum of improved health and
wellness.
Recovery emerges from hope and gratitude.
Recovery involves a process of healing and self-redefinition.
Recovery involves addressing discrimination and transcending shame and stigma.
Recovery is supported by peers and allies.
Recovery involves (re)joining and (re)building a life in the
95
community.
What is striking about both recovery principles and desistance narratives is the degree to which they are personal. An
individual’s ability to redefine himself as a person who lives a
law-abiding life is an endeavor that requires reflection, healing
from past trauma, and patience with the process (or “continu96
um”) of becoming well. It also requires a great amount of selfreflection and self-initiative, a fact that has led some scholars
to question whether a probation program that functions solely
on conditioning can have any lasting effect:
[S]wift-and-certain theory says little about why offenders will obey
the law once they are off probation and no longer subject to any sanctions, swift or otherwise. It is possible that swift-and-certain probation will interrupt offenders’ involvement in crime long enough that
the extinction of the behavior will occur, making post-probation punishment unnecessary. But psychological research also would predict
that the effects of punitive sanctions will attenuate once surveillance
97
is no longer omnipresent and the sanctions are rarely imposed.

When the characteristics of individuals at risk of revoca94. CORI KAUTZ SHEEDY & MELANIE WHITTER, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., GUIDING PRINCIPLES AND ELEMENTS OF RECOVERY-ORIENTED
SYSTEMS OF CARE: WHAT DO WE KNOW FROM THE RESEARCH? 1 (2009), available at http://www.naadac.org/assets/1959/sheedyckwhitterm2009_guiding_
principles_and_elements.pdf.
95. Id. at 1–2.
96. Id.
97. Francis T. Cullen et al., Before Adopting Project Hope, Read the Warning Label: A Rejoinder to Kleiman, Kilmer, and Fisher’s Comment, 78 FED.
PROBATION 75, 76 (2014).
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tion are closely examined, concerns that the effects of deterrence-based programs will not persist are amplified. For that
reason, the following subsection reviews what we know about
the people at whom HOPE is targeted: those on their way to
prison.
B. CHARACTERISTICS OF THOSE BEING DETERRED
Although the HOPE model does not alter sanctions based
on the individual characteristics of probationers, the identity of
those under supervision matters in ways relevant to desistance,
if not to deterrence theory itself. Criminal-justice-involved individuals are disadvantaged in a number of significant and
overlapping ways, some well-documented and others less so.
98
Most obviously, they are poor. They are also disproportionate99
ly black and brown.
98. Estimates suggest that more than eighty percent of felony defendants
are indigent, though with no reliable national statistics on the question, it is
difficult to know for certain. See generally Erica J. Hashimoto, Class Matters,
101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 31, 60 (2011) (“[A]vailable data indicate that
almost eighty percent of felony defendants in state courts in the seventy-five
largest counties have court-appointed representation. . . . In other words, less
than a fifth of the population was charged with seventy-eight percent of the
felonies in criminal cases across the country.”). What is clear is that public defenders represent millions of indigent people in criminal cases every year. See
OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INDIGENT DEFENSE
FACT SHEET (2011), available at http://ojp.gov/newsroom/factsheets/ojpfs_
indigentdefense.html. Indigence reflects more than conventional poverty;
while standards vary from one jurisdiction to the next, people who qualify as
indigent for appointment of counsel must usually fall at or close to the federal
poverty line—an amount that reflects the minimum income needed to avoid
malnutrition, not the amount needed to pay a lawyer to offer meaningful representation in a criminal case. Benjamin Hoorn Barton, Measuring Poverty: A
New Approach, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1993, 1995 (1996) (book review).
99. See Sharon L. Davies, Study Habits: Probing Modern Attempts To Assess Minority Offender Disproportionality, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 2003, at 17. Nationally, the rate of incarceration is nearly six times higher
for African American men, three times higher for Native American men, and
two times higher for Latino men than it is for white men. See JOHN
PAWASARAT & LOIS M. QUINN, EMP’T & TRAINING INST. UNIV. OF WIS.MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN’S MASS INCARCERATION OF AFRICAN AMERICAN
MALES: WORKFORCE CHALLENGES FOR 2013, at 2 (2013), available at
http://www4.uwm.edu/eti/2013/BlackImprisonment.pdf. Among women, “black
females were imprisoned at more than twice the rate of white females” in
2013. CARSON, supra note 39, at 8. Disparities are particularly pronounced for
African Americans. Although only 13.6% of the population is African American, almost 40% of the prison population is black. See id. at 15; SONYA
RASTOGI ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE BLACK POPULATION: 2010, at 3
(2011); see also Michael Tonry & Matthew Melewski, The Malign Effects of
Drug and Crime Control Policies on Black Americans, 37 CRIME & JUST. 1, 2
(2008) (“Blacks constitute 12.8 percent of the general population in 2005 but
nearly half of prison inmates and 42 percent of Death Row residents.”).
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But there are other, less obvious ways in which individuals
who end up incarcerated are disadvantaged that matter to
their prospects for both short-term deterrence and long-term
desistance. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, sixtyeight percent of state prisoners have less than a high-school
100
education. The reasons for this vary, and include not only educational disruptions due to criminal behavior, but also instability in families and homes, the need to secure income for or
provide labor assistance to families, and unmet learning
101
needs. Among those without a high school diploma, 59% suffered from a diagnosed speech disability, 66% had a diagnosed
102
learning disability, and 37% had additional disabilities.
Closely related to learning and language deficits are impulsivity and deficits in attention. Studies have consistently
found higher rates of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder
(ADHD) among prisoners than those found in the general popu103
lation. Those with ADHD struggle with impulse control and
problem-solving, and are, consequently, at heightened risk for
104
involvement with the justice system.
Importantly, mental illness is dramatically more prevalent
105
among prisoners than it is in the general population, with
100. CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EDUCATION AND
CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS 1 (2003), available at http://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/ecp.pdf. More specifically, “[a]bout 75% of State prison inmates, almost 59% of Federal inmates, and 69% of jail inmates did not complete high school.” Id. at 3. In 2004, the average North Carolinian entering
prison had an eleventh grade education, read at the ninth grade level, and
completed math problems at the seventh grade level. OFFICE OF RESEARCH &
PLANNING, N.C. DEP’T OF CORR., EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT OF INMATES
ENTERING NORTH CAROLINA’S PRISONS 1 (2005).
101. According to a Bureau of Justice Statistics report: “Over a third of jail
inmates and a sixth of the general population said the main reason they quit
school was because of academic problems, behavior problems, or lost interest.
About a fifth of jail inmates and two-fifths of the general population gave economic reasons for leaving school, primarily going to work, joining the military,
or needing money.” HARLOW, supra note 100, at 3.
102. Id. at 1. Striking as these statistics are, they are highly conservative
estimations, since most prisons do not routinely test for learning and communicative deficits.
103. See Amelia M. Usher et al., Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder in
a Canadian Prison Population, 36 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 311 (2013) (“While
there is a wide range of rates estimated for ADHD in adult forensic populations, most are considerably higher than among non-offender populations
. . . .”).
104. See generally Jason Fletcher & Barbara Wolfe, Long-Term Consequences of Childhood ADHD on Criminal Activities, 12 J. MENTAL HEALTH
POL’Y ECON. 119 (2009).
105. Jeffrey L. Metzner et al., Treatment in Jails and Prisons, in
TREATMENT OF OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL DISORDERS 211 (Robert M.
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significant mental illness estimated to run at a rate three to
four times higher in the prison population than in the general
106
population. Approximately 15% of state prisoners reported
symptoms consistent with a psychotic disorder, along with 24%
107
of jail inmates. A total of 56.2% of state prisoners reported
one or more mental health problems—a figure far greater than
the 11% of people in the general population who suffer from
108
similar mental health problems.
The prevalence of educational deficits, learning and language disabilities, and mental illness among potential probationers has important implications for correctional supervision.
In this respect, many of the challenges that arise in a correctional setting are clearly analogous to those faced by probationers:
Prison order and discipline is built on oral communications and expectations of compliance and self-regulation. If one has difficulty in
that realm, the troubles cascade and build on each other. This cannot
be easily explained or understood by the inmate who has likely had a
lifetime of misunderstanding. In the correctional setting, the deficit
may reveal itself in more “tickets” and other sanctions. This can create an official perception that the inmate is irresponsible, needs to
learn to be accountable, or does not want to learn and conform to the
109
discipline system.

Similarly, probationers who struggle to order, comprehend,
and retain information are more likely to struggle with following multiple directives simultaneously, which they must do if
110
they are to comply with the conditions of their supervision.
Wittstein ed., 1998) (“[S]tudies and clinical experience indicate that 8–19% of
prisoners have significant psychiatric or functional disabilities and another
15–20% will require some form of psychiatric intervention during their incarceration.”).
106. Risdon N. Slate et al., Training Federal Probation Officers As Mental
Health Specialists, 68 FED. PROBATION 9 (2004). Studies that rely on prisoners’ self-reporting of symptoms yield grimmer results. A 2005 study by the Bureau of Justice Statistics found that 43% of state prisoners and 54% of jail inmates met the diagnostic criteria for mania, while “23% of state prisoners and
30% of jail inmates reported symptoms of major depression.” DORIS J. JAMES &
LAUREN E. GLAZE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS OF
PRISON AND JAIL INMATES 1 (2006), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/mhppji.pdf.
107. JAMES & GLAZE, supra note 106, at 1.
108. Id. at 3. These rates were even higher for female prisoners, with approximately three-quarters of both state prisoners and jail inmates reporting
symptoms of one or more mental illnesses. Id. at 2.
109. Michele LaVigne & Gregory J. Van Rybroek, Breakdown in the Language Zone: The Prevalence of Language Impairments Among Juvenile and
Adult Offenders and Why It Matters, 15 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 37, 98
(2011).
110. See id. at 59–60 (“Research has consistently shown ‘a strikingly high

1654

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[99:1631

While probationers with language deficits struggle to understand all that is required of them, those with ADHD may have
difficulty following through on their obligations due to poor im111
pulse control. The mentally ill similarly struggle with compliance on the street and in prison environments, where they
are limited in their ability to cope with the environmental and social
stressors . . . and to adhere to the highly regimented routine demanded by prisons. This inability to adapt is often a function and symptom
of mental illness: certain mental disorders are defined by breaks with
reality and limitations in one’s ability to control emotions and behav112
ior.

Many of the same challenges exist for mentally ill probationers. In fact, because probationers lack the staffing and close
supervision found in the prison environment, some may strug113
gle even more to comply with lengthy lists of conditions.
Complying with probation orders means having the capacity to
plan ahead to avoid conflicts with work, meet child care obligations, attend mandatory programs and court appointments, and
budget to meet basic costs of living, all while making restitution payments and paying mandatory supervision fees. Many of
these requirements are difficult to accomplish in the singular—
in the aggregate they quickly overwhelm those probationers
who are already disadvantaged by illness or other disability.
The degree to which individuals in prison are disadvantaged
may elicit sympathy, but for proponents of deterrence-based
programs, it is also likely to elicit the fundamental question “so
what?” HOPE does not accommodate the mentally ill or adjust
punishment to reflect the relative ability of each probationer to
[though] less than perfect comorbidity of language and learning disabilities
with a range of behavioral and emotional disturbances’ such as anxiety, depression, hyperactivity, frustration, impulsivity and conduct disorders.” (citation omitted)).
111. In this context, too, the experience of prisoners is instructive:
“[o]ffenders with ADHD may have more trouble adjusting to the constraints of
incarceration as well as increased difficulty following the rules of the institution and managing relationships with other offenders.” Amelia M. Usher et al.,
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder in a Canadian Prison Population, 36
INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 311, 312 (2013). One study found that prisoners with
high levels of ADHD symptoms were “2.5 times more likely to incur an institutional charge during their sentence although even moderate levels of ADHD
symptoms predicted poorer institutional behavior.” Id. at 314.
112. E. Lea Johnston, Vulnerability and Just Desert, 103 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 147, 170–71 (2013).
113. For a discussion of some of the ways in which probation agencies are
responding to the needs of mentally ill probationers through specialty caseloads, see generally Sarah M. Manchak et al., High-Fidelity Specialty Mental
Health Probation Improves Officer Practices, Treatment Access, and Rule
Compliance, 38 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 450 (2014).
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comply with the court’s expectations. And yet, even without
those modifications, the program has been shown to improve
114
overall compliance by probationers. Moreover, the relative
success of program participants suggests that most HOPE probationers get the message that punishment should be avoided.
Despite all their deficits, these successful probationers seem to
“pull it together” enough to avoid repeating violations that are
likely to get them sanctioned. That is a victory in the eyes of
HOPE supporters because it shows that a substantial number
of probationers can be forced to stay on the straight and narrow
without expensive interventions like mental health counseling
or close case management. And given the resource constraints
115
courts and correctional agencies face, that is sure to be welcome news to criminal justice administrators.
As well taken as those defenses may be, the vulnerabilities
and deficits of probationers matter to more than just deterrence. Compliance can signal many things. In its best form, it
indicates that a probationer is taking responsibility for his past
wrongs and present conduct, is ordering his life in a way that is
not directed to crime, and is submitting to the legitimate authority of the state. But it can also mean that a probationer has
been cowed into submission, is temporarily and superficially
acquiescent, or has grown content to let others order the details
of his days.
Many of the factors that influence desistance from crime
bear little connection to the conditions imposed by sentences of
community supervision. Some of these factors are outright inhibited by the strict, formulaic enforcement of rules required by
programs like HOPE. When probationers are subject to rules
that needlessy restrict their freedom, they are infantilized and
disempowered. And even when rules promote desistance on
their face (by prohibiting drug use or requiring periodic meetings with a probation officer), punishing their violation without
accounting for the context in which they were violated is a lost
opportunity for identifying the challenges—whether material or
psychological—that must be overcome in order to advance the
process of desistance.
While custodial sanctions are sometimes warranted, reflexively imposing jail time for all violations, however minor or un114. Hawken, supra note 37, at 37.
115. See, e.g., JUSTICE POLICY INST., SYSTEM OVERLOAD: THE COSTS OF
UNDER-RESOURCING PUBLIC DEFENSE (2011), available at http://www.
justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/system_overload_final.pdf
(describing the overburdened public defender system).
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derstandable, interferes with probationers’ ability to forge
longer-term supports in the community by maintaining employment and engaging meaningfully with family members—
116
something they cannot do while locked in a jail cell. Probation
does not last forever, and a primary goal of supervision must be
to “connect with and activate internal values within wrongdoers with the goal of encouraging self-regulatory law-related be117
havior in the future.” To the degree that pure deterrence conflicts with that goal, its primacy should be questioned.
C. THE ROLE OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
Although many aspects of desistance relate directly to the
environment and personal narrative of the individual offender,
there is another aspect of desistance that is more outwardly focused. When people trust the legitimacy of the institutions that
enforce the law, their rates of compliance with the law in118
crease. When people “experience the criminal justice system
and its authorities as acting justly,” research indicates that
they will follow the law willingly, without need for threat of
119
sanction. Consequently, it is important for courts and probation agencies to pay attention to the factors that promote a
sense of legitimacy if they wish to promote sustained desistance.
HOPE advocates have long been aware of the importance
of procedural justice and have suggested that the consistency of
HOPE’s response to violations makes people feel treated fairly
because all probationers’ violations are sanctioned in the same
120
way. While advocates are right that perceptions about fairness matter, research in procedural justice suggests those perceptions are shaped by factors for which HOPE does not ade121
quately account.
116. See Nagin, supra note 9, at 200 (stating that there is “little evidence of
a specific deterrent effect arising from the experience of imprisonment compared with the experience of noncustodial sanctions”).
117. Tom R. Tyler, Restorative Justice and Procedural Justice: Dealing
with Rule Breaking, 62 J. SOC. ISSUES 307, 307 (2006).
118. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 4–56 (2006).
119. Tyler, supra note 117, at 309.
120. See Hawken, supra note 37, at 41 (“The consistent application of a behavioral contract improves compliance.”).
121. See Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective
Rule of Law, 30 CRIME & JUST. REV. RES. 283, 286 (2003) (“[While officials]
can and often do compel obedience through the threat or use of force, they can
also gain the cooperation of the people with whom they deal. Cooperation and
consent—‘buy in’—are important because they facilitate immediate acceptance
and long-term compliance. People are more likely to adhere to agreements and
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Perhaps counterintuitively, people’s judgments about legitimacy have little to do with the outcome of past contacts with
122
the legal system. Instead, their judgments turn on several
key factors, including the perceived impartiality and fairness of
the decisionmaker and their opportunity to tell their stories
and have their explanations meaningfully considered by the
123
decisionmaker before judgment is imposed. Closely related is
the degree to which they feel they have been treated with dig124
nity.
While HOPE administrators may speak respectfully and
impose the same punishment on everyone, if they offer probationers no meaningful opportunity to explain the reasons for
their violations—to hear from probationers about the ways in
which their life challenges may be affecting their ability to
comply with the mountain of conditions to which they are subject—they are unlikely to retain legitimacy in the eyes of those
subject to sanction. And if the sanctioning process reduces perceptions of fairness, then regardless whether HOPE promotes
compliance during the term of supervision, it will reduce the
odds that the probationer will internalize the law’s legitimacy
and thereby decrease the probationer’s odds of long-term compliance with the law.
To make this problem more concrete, consider a form of
disadvantage probationers experience that has not previously
been discussed. For those involved in deterrence-based correctional programs, life experiences of trauma—often at the hands
of authority figures—are nearly universal. Whether that trauma involved direct physical or sexual abuse or the first-hand
observation of extreme violence (murders, rapes, etc.) as an innocent bystander, people who have been incarcerated (who
closely resemble the high-risk probationers who are most likely
to participate in deterrence-based correctional programs) have
125
almost all been exposed to traumatic events, often repeatedly.
follow rules over time when they ‘buy into’ the decisions and directives of legal
authorities.”).
122. TYLER, supra note 118, at 163–64.
123. See id. (describing the meaning of procedural justice).
124. See id.; Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Civil
Commitment Hearing, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 37, 44 (1999) (explaining
that the subject’s involvement in the legal process affects perceptions of those
processes by the subject).
125. Studies of prisoners reveal devastatingly high rates of trauma. See,
e.g., SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., DEP’T HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., ESSENTIAL COMPONENTS OF TRAUMA-INFORMED JUDICIAL
PRACTICE 2 (2013), available at http://www.nasmhpd.org/docs/NCTIC/
JudgesEssential_5%201%202013finaldraft.pdf (discussing studies on trauma);
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For some, this exposure will lead to post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), a serious mental illness, characterized by flashbacks to traumatic events, memory gaps, avoidant behaviors,
126
and sometimes violent outbursts.
Even for those without
PTSD, trauma can leave lasting effects. When trauma is experienced in youth, it can affect the developing brain, leaving
trauma survivors with impaired activity in the areas of the
127
brain that regulate “emotion, memory and behavior.” These
early experiences of trauma can increase the presence of stress
hormones and affect the brain’s ability to regulate stress and
128
engage logical problem-solving skills. Experiences of trauma
129
have been closely correlated with substance abuse, problems
130
sustaining interpersonal relationships, and difficulty sustain131
ing attention.
For those with past experiences of trauma, many basic features of the criminal justice system can cause traumatic responses by reviving memories—and sometimes even physical
JUSTICE POLICY INST., HEALING INVISIBLE WOUNDS: WHY INVESTING IN
TRAUMA-INFORMED CARE FOR CHILDREN MAKES SENSE 5 (2010), available at
http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/10-07_REP_
HealingInvisibleWounds_jj-ps.pdf (“Studies . . . report that between 75–93
percent of youth entering the juvenile justice system annually are estimated to
have experienced some degree of traumatic victimization.”); JESSICA REICHERT
& LINDSAY BOSTWICK, ILL. CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFO. AUTH., POST-TRAUMATIC
STRESS DISORDER AND VICTIMIZATION AMONG FEMALE PRISONERS IN ILLINOIS
8 (2010), available at http://www.icjia.state.il.us/public/pdf/ResearchReports/
PTSD_Female_Prisoners_Report_1110.pdf (finding among women in an Illinois prison that 98% had suffered physical abuse and 75% had been sexually
abused); CARON ZLOTNICK, TREATMENT OF INCARCERATED WOMEN WITH
SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER, FINAL REPORT 3
(2002), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/195165.pdf (reporting “that 78 to 85% of incarcerated women have experienced at least one
traumatic event”).
126. See, e.g., REICHERT & BOSTWICK, supra note 125, at 11 (finding that
sixty percent of female prisoners interview qualified for a PTSD diagnosis).
127. See SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., supra note
125, at 2 (describing the effects of childhood trauma).
128. Id.
129. See Kathleen T. Brady et al., Substance Abuse and Posttraumatic
Stress Disorder, 13 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 206, 206 (2004) (reporting that 36–50% of people who seek treatment for substance abuse disorders meet the diagnostic criteria for PTSD).
130. See generally Melanie Randall & Lori Haskell, Trauma-Informed Approaches to Law: Why Restorative Justice Must Understand Trauma and Psychological Coping, 36 DALHOUSIE L.J. 501 (2013) (describing the importance of
understanding trauma in the legal context).
131. See generally NAT’L CHILD TRAUMATIC STRESS NETWORK, EFFECTS OF
COMPLEX TRAUMA, available at http://www.nctsn.org/sites/default/files/assets/
pdfs/impact_of_complex_trauma_final.pdf (describing the impact of complex
trauma).
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132

sensations—associated with past harm.

Re-traumatization refers to the psychological and physiological experience of being “triggered,” perhaps by a smell, a sound, or a sensation, that recreates or recalls the original abuse. Triggers for retraumatization may include strip searches, room searches that involve inspecting personal items, cuffs or restraints, isolation, sudden
room changes, yelling, and insults . . . . All these experiences keep old
wounds open and may invoke habitual, self-protective responses, in133
cluding violent outbursts and withdrawal from treatment.

For these individuals—particularly those whose trauma
was rooted in physical abuse—fair process takes on heightened
importance, since many of the routine aspects of sanctioning
(such as forcible arrest and confinement) may be retraumatizing to a degree that not only exceeds the bounds of
proportional punishment, but that also creates obstacles to the
individual’s long-term behavioral and emotional health.
When the only questions relevant to the court are whether
a violation occurred and what amount of custody should be imposed as a result, probationers lose the ability to tell their story
and have it meaningfully considered by the judge. While in
many cases, the explanations probationers will offer will not
justify deviation from the usual punishment—taking personal
responsibility for decisions is an important component of a de134
sistance narrative, after all —in other cases, the violation will
be mitigated by life circumstances that matter in terms of culpability. A relapse triggered by contact with a former assailant
or by a fresh assault is qualitatively different from a relapse
precipitated by a night of partying with friends. Similarly, the
probationer who misses an appointment because of a sick child
or mandatory overtime at work should be entitled to explain
her situation to the court. Prohibiting the court from considering the circumstances of a violation and factoring those circumstances into a decision about whether or how much to punish
decreases confidence in the fundamental fairness of probation.
Justice in this context matters intrinsically, of course. But it also matters instrumentally. While such sanctioning may deter
immediate violations of the conditions of probation, it does so at
the cost of decreasing probationers’ long-term prospects for
compliance with the law.

132. SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., supra note 125,
at 5.
133. Id. at 2.
134. See MARUNA, supra note 1, at 148–51 (explaining the role of “I” in redemption narratives).
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CONCLUSION: PURPOSE MATTERS
HOPE was one judge’s response to a probation system that
was broken: before HOPE, rules of supervision were ignored
with impunity until they reached a sudden tipping point, when
the punishment became the sudden and severe sanction of full
135
revocation. In the face of that broken system, Judge Alm devised an innovative way to improve the effectiveness of probation. That kind of robust innovation should be lauded by academics and policymakers alike.
But all innovations can easily become routine conventions.
Soon enough, HOPE will be “probation as usual” in many jurisdictions around the country. And therein lies potential danger,
not just for HOPE but for any innovation. Having justified the
need for a new model of probation and having persuaded ourselves that it is better than what existed before, it is easy to
stop asking whether the program best advances the ultimate
purpose of probation: assisting people in becoming productive,
law-abiding citizens, not only during the period of supervision,
but afterward. HOPE may well be the best program on the
market for deterring probationers from violating conditions of
supervision. But complying perfectly with rules is not the highest good we should be seeking to promote. Probation is not fundamentally about human conditioning; it is about engaging
with autonomous moral agents in the process of behavioral
change. Doing so requires considering the context of violations
when selecting punishment, and imposing sanctions that are
proportional to the infraction that has occurred. In many cases,
HOPE achieves that result, but in others it does not.
Like Judge Alm, advocates of HOPE often analogize the
practices of deterrence-based programs to good parenting,
where consistency is key. But there are differences between
parenting and HOPE that matter. Good parents always consider context when responding to rule violations, and when they
impose consequences on their children, they never use cages.
While the role of the state can never mirror wholly the role of a
benign parent, it can go further in fairly and parsimoniously
sanctioning rule violations. Our courts must leave room for understanding why violations occur and for responding in ways
that are proportional to the culpability of the violator, as well
as the severity of the infraction.
Moreover, while custody is in some cases appropriate, we
135. See KLEIMAN, supra note 65, at 4 (explaining how the U.S. criminal
justice system could avoid unnecessary incarcerations).

2015]

WHAT ARE WE HOPING FOR?

1661

must do better to develop noncustodial penalties that hold probationers accountable without impeding probationers’ ability to
stay connected to the informal and prosocial influences of employment, family, and community that lead to long-term desistance from crime. The idea that incarceration is the quantum and kind of punishment required in order to achieve
accountability is a uniquely American phenomenon, driven in
all likelihood by our confusion about scale. Our criminal justice
system punishes so harshly and so often that jail seems like a
“micro-sanction” simply because it is so much less punitive
than the revocation sentences to which we have become accus136
tomed. It is important to recognize that the ways in which we
are executing punishment may be doing significant harm even
if they also increase probationers’ compliance with the conditions of supervision.
Creating a more responsive system does not require costly
new programs or unrealistic expansion of the current criminal
justice infrastructure. In places that use deterrence-based correctional programs, probation officers already spend time meeting with higher-risk probationers and bringing them before the
court for sanctioning. Adding to those meetings a conversation
about how the probationer is doing and why he is having difficulty complying with certain conditions does not take much
time and can yield valuable insights into the root causes of offending for a particular individual, opening up possibilities for
new ways of engaging the probationer and connecting him to
prosocial influences in the community. In fact, many probation
agencies across the country are already training their agents to
engage in just such conversations through the use of motivational interviewing and counseling techniques designed to increase probationers’ motivation to change and take ownership
137
of the solutions to their own problems.
136. See generally ROBERT A. FERGUSON, INFERNO: AN ANATOMY OF
AMERICAN PUNISHMENT (2014) (discussing the harsh sanctioning unique to
the American penal system). As an example of a way in which our sanctioning
defies what we know of human behavior, consider that psychological research
has repeatedly confirmed that people are more motivated to change more by
praise than by condemnation from those who have power over them. See, e.g.,
Judy Cameron et al., Achievement-Based Rewards and Intrinsic Motivation: A
Test of Cognitive Mediators, 97 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 641 (2005). Even so, HOPE
utilizes no positive rewards other than decreases in frequency of drug testing
over time.
137. See, e.g., SCOTT T. WALTERS ET AL., MOTIVATING OFFENDERS TO
CHANGE: A GUIDE FOR PROBATION AND PAROLE 1–9 (2007), available at
https://s3.amazonaws.com/static.nicic.gov/Library/022253.pdf (explaining the
benefits of motivational interviews).
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Leaving room to consider context when sanctioning does
not mean abandoning accountability. Probation officers can respond to violations themselves or ask courts to impose sanctions that reflect the genuine variation in individual culpability
for offending. A relapse occasioned by abuse can result in a referral for trauma counseling; missing an appointment can be
sanctioned by the imposition of community service hours or a
temporary increase in the frequency of reporting. Failure to pay
restitution can be sanctioned by an increase in the monthly
payment if the failure was willful, or it can be addressed by a
decrease in the monthly obligation if the failure is due to genuine poverty. Imposing proportional, sensible sanctions is a task
that requires little more than imagination and good sense. We
do no less for our children and employees, and expect no less for
ourselves from our superiors. To say that less is warranted in
the context of correctional supervision, where probationers’
needs are high and the requirements placed upon them significant, is to sanction potential injustice in the name of efficiency.
For all of their promise, programs like HOPE (and the
compliance they promote) cannot become ends unto themselves.
Instead, like any criminal justice intervention, deterrencebased correctional programs must be used as tools to advance
the larger goal of empowering probationers to desist from
crime—to trade criminality and addiction for more mature,
prosocial modes of living. And when the requirements of deterrence impede the larger goal of promoting desistance, promoting desistance should trump deterrence.

